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LPA ref: Y06/1647/SH (New Terminal  
Building), Y06/1648/SH (Runway  
Extension)

Statement of Common Ground between  
Mr Nigel Deacon and Dr John Allan

February 2011

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## **1. Introduction**

- 1.1. This Statement of Common Ground (SCG) has been agreed jointly between Mr Nigel Deacon and Dr John Allan. This SCG seeks to agree matters relating to birdstrike risk assessment and mitigation measures.
- 1.2. The matters which have been agreed between Mr Deacon and Dr Allan are as follows:
  - a) The importance of the birdstrike risk in general is not disputed.
  - b) The birdstrike risk at the Airport is manageable within currently accepted safety standards provided that the appropriate policies and practices are applied with sufficient intensity and over an appropriate area;
  - c) the Bird Hazard Risk Assessment (BHRA) methodology is agreed, but not its proper application nor the adequacy of its underlying data;
  - d) the techniques and organisation described in the Bird Control Management Plan are agreed; but not its scope and intensity, as these are informed by the BHRA described above.

## **2. General Principles**

### 2.1 We agree that:

2.1.1 the management of the birdstrike risk at the Airport is essential,

2.1.2 that turbine engined aircraft are more vulnerable to birdstrike damage than piston engined types, and business jets (small jet powered aircraft generally of 20 seats or less) are the most vulnerable non-military aircraft types.

### **3. Bird Hazard Risk Assessment**

#### 3.1 We agree that:

3.1.1 The basic risk assessment methodology is generally appropriate.

3.1.2 The strike numbers likely to be associated with different strike frequency categories in the risk assessment matrix are not disputed.

#### 3.2 We disagree on:

3.2.1 Whether the data used to inform the BHRA are adequate in terms of quality, type, presentation and analysis.

3.2.2 Whether the methodology has been appropriately carried out

3.2.3 Whether the resulting risk assessment accurately estimates the risk and hence adequately informs the bird control management plan in terms of the intensity and range of bird control measures likely to be required

### **4. Bird Control Management Plan (BCMP)**

4.1 The bird management techniques proposed and the bird control staffing structure in the BCMP are agreed, and accepted as appropriate to the proposed future operation of the Airport, with the following clarifications and caveats:

#### 4.2 We agree that: -

4.2.1 a shift in the bird control methodology at the Airport from the previous system of short “bird scaring runs” by airport employees to virtually continuous patrolling of the airport is necessary to protect business jets and commercial turbine engined aircraft. It will also require the use of techniques and/or strategies that are additional, or different, to those currently in use (see below);

4.2.2 it is necessary for flight safety purposes for the Airport to manage hazardous birds in the fields immediately adjacent to the airport where possible. This may

involve habitat management and/or the application of standard bird dispersal techniques within or, if necessary and possible, outside the airport boundary;

4.2.3 it may be possible to exercise restraint in the use of pyrotechnics and distress calls in the “advisory zones” marked on figures 1 and 2 in normal circumstances (as the areas indicated are unattractive to hazardous species) but this will not override the need, nor limit the methods or intensity of the techniques used, to disperse hazardous birds from these areas if a threat to air safety is identified.

4.2.4 That, where possible, it is preferable to manage bird flight lines through vulnerable airspace by taking action at either the source or destination of such bird traffic (where such localised sources can be identified).

4.2.5 That if control of hazardous bird flight lines at source or destination cannot be achieved, and whenever an immediate short-term risk from crossing birds is identified, the passing of warnings to aircrew via Air Traffic Control is appropriate.

4.2.6 That, in addition to necessary active bird control, scrub removal, particularly from the areas closer the runway and, where possible, the netting of airside water bodies to exclude hazardous birds is appropriate to help to reduce the birdstrike hazard associated with game birds and waterfowl.

## **5. Aerodrome Safeguarding**

5.1 We agree that:

5.1.1 Aerodrome Safeguarding is an essential component of the Airport’s Safety Management System, and that the Airport is required by the CAA to implement an auditable safeguarding process;

5.1.2 that the Airport is not Officially Safeguarded, and therefore any policies, agreements and systems will be informal and the Airport will have more limited powers to influence the planning process than an Officially Safeguarded Aerodrome.

5.1.3 compromise between air safety and conservation interests is usually achievable, and some positive conservation measures will have no impact on the birdstrike risk;

5.1.4 each case must be assessed on its individual merits, and

5.1.5 in the absence of any existing air safety related bird management plans at local sites, changes to current permissions and site management agreements cannot be imposed retrospectively, and therefore cannot adversely affect the current status of the Designated Sites and RSPB reserve.

Mr Nigel Deacon

Dr John Richard Allan

22<sup>nd</sup> February 2011