

April 7th, 2009

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Dear Terry

Lydd Airport Action Group - Response

**Third set of Supplementary Environmental Information - Planning Applications:
Y06/1647/SH (new terminal to accommodate up to 500,000ppa) and
Y06/1648/SH (runway extension - 294m extension plus 150m starter extension)**

LAAG believes the planning applications - Y06/1647/SH and Y06/1648/SH should be rejected. The third set of Supplementary Environmental Information (SEI (3)) does not change our view and LAAG stands by the comments made in our original response and in our responses to the first and second sets of Supplementary Environmental Information (SEI (1) and SEI (2)) dated respectively November 15th 2007 and October 24th, 2008.

There remain omissions and inaccuracies in the information provided to date which have not been addressed in SEI(3), and information in SEI (3) remains inaccurate. **The persistent reluctance to provide accurate information is reason alone to reject the planning application.**

Over the last three years LAAG has made a number of recommendations regarding outstanding information. These recommendations were made in response to the original planning application and to SEI (1) and SEI (2). We repeat the recommendations made in the second set of Supplementary Environmental Information (SEI (2) dated October 24th, 2008 which captured the recommendations outstanding at that date. Many of these recommendations have been ignored or remain incomplete. The extent to which these recommendations have been addressed is indicated in bold.

State of Previous Recommendations for Additional Information

(1) Re-submit the planning application based on the plans outlined in the Scoping Opinion, with the outline planning application for phase 2 of the terminal supported by an EIA based on 2mppa. **Not Provided**

(2) Provide a “do nothing scenario”. **Upper baseline of 300,000ppa now portrayed as “do nothing scenario”.**

(3) Provide accurate, comprehensive flight path information for both commercial and light aircraft. **Improvement but some flight paths remain incorrect, while the four**

groups of aircraft types covering the fleet mix assumed for the purposes of the noise model have incorrectly assigned aircraft. For example, 36% of the aircraft in Group 3 should be in Group 4.

(4) Provide accurate baseline information about the airport today, including accurate statistics for aircraft movements, the nature of the current aircraft mix, and the location and description of restricted flight zones over and around the Dungeness nuclear power stations and the Lydd and Hythe Military Ranges. **Tables of actual movements by different aircraft in 2005 contain anomalies which raise questions about the reliability of the data. The no fly zone around Dungeness continues to be inaccurately depicted.**

(5) Reassess all information dependent on flight paths and the correct baselines - noise contours, the impact of noise on birds of conservation interest, bird hazard control, socio economic impacts, light and air pollutant analyses and the impact of light and air pollution on invertebrates. **Flight paths and the allocation of aircraft to routes remain incorrect - above need repeating based on accurate information**

(6) Provide an analysis of how increased operations at Lydd will fit into en route airspace - i.e. how traffic integrates with that from other airports. This is essential for the understanding of flight paths for commercial passenger carrying aircraft. **More realistic but mistakes remain**

(7) Provide an environmental assessment of the impact of the removal and re-installation of the ILS aerials, or if it is intended for the aerials to remain in the current location, outline how the airport intends to fully utilise the extended runway without breaching International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and CAA guidelines. **Not Provided**

(8) Assess the impact of the seasonality of the business on pollutants at the receptors. **Not Provided**

(9) Provide an analysis as to why passenger numbers have been consistently lower than 5000 ppa for the last 10 years and why Lydd Airport needs to extend the runway when it is still only operating today at less than 1% of its current terminal capacity of 300,000ppa and less than 2.0% of the Aviation White Paper's assessment of its likely projected operating capacity of 125,000 in 2030. **Not Provided**

(10) Provide an analysis of how Lydd Airport's new facilities, flight infrastructure and use of runways compares with other regional airports. **Not Provided**

(11) Undertake a radar based migratory bird studies as this is the only definitive way in which to gauge the scale of bird migration at Dungeness. **Not Provided**

(12) Undertake a comprehensive aquatic and terrestrial invertebrate survey covering a wide range of habitats over at least the area of the airport, but preferably a wider area. Habitats includes vegetated shingle, wetlands, dry grassland, ephemeral vegetation, scrub, swamp, margins of standing water, marshy grassland, semi-improved and unimproved, but managed grassland and bare shingle. All historic data must be taken into account and at least four visits during the season made, starting in mid May and using all the trapping methods already employed. **Not Provided.**

(13) Undertake a separate moth survey - a minimum of four moth trapping sessions during the season. **Moth Survey in SEI (2) undertaken, but inadequate.**

(14) Survey for medicinal leeches in all ditches on site or connected with them and all other water bodies. **Not Undertaken**

(15) Assess the impact of light pollution on invertebrates and changes in flora due to increased nitrogen inputs since vegetation changes will adversely affect rare invertebrates in the area. **Not Undertaken**

(16) Ensure adequate mitigation proposals are in place (for invertebrates), that the Airport commits to these, and that provision is made for monitoring in the future to assess the efficacy of the mitigation undertaken. **Proposals remain inadequate**

COMMENTS – SUPPLEMENTARY ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION

A good deal of the material in SEI(3) is regurgitated material from the past and much of it is either incorrect or fatuous.

We draw your attention to LAAG's analysis in **2.1 and 3.3** which clearly demonstrates why there is no case for a second regional airport in Kent. The two airports are operating at a fraction of their total capacity and are heavily loss making. Lydd Airport's expansion will add additional capacity and lead to further pressure on profits as the additional capacity will not create additional demand, while Lydd Airport after expansion will compete more directly with Manston Airport in the short haul market, further undermining the region's incumbent and superior regional airport. Profit and employment maximisation will be associated with one - not two - regional airports in Kent.

Further, we demonstrate in section **4.0** that Shepway District Council cannot assume that the NII's stance on Dungeness B - ie its belief that crash damage risk is not material - will hold for a proposed new nuclear power station. The siting decision rests with the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), not the NII. Proximity to civil aircraft movements will be considered in the siting process which means an on going public debate about the safety risks associated with having a regional airport at Lydd could jeopardise the planning application for Dungeness C.

The main points regarding the current set of Supplementary Environmental Information (SEI 3) are summarised below:

1.0 Overview of Key Assumptions in the Environmental Statements (Volume 1 of 5, 4.)

1.1: Baselines

4.2 & 4.5: The only relevant baseline is the current case line. The contention in 4.5 that the proposed runway would "neither change the size of the largest aircraft that can currently use the airport, nor would it alter significantly the flight paths available for aircraft landing or taking off" - is only partly correct in theory and grossly misleading in practice. As stated in earlier submissions Lydd Airport is patronised principally by light aircraft used by the local flying club. Aircraft up to a **non** fully loaded B737 can fly from the airport in theory, but do not in practice. Indeed, the aircraft listed as Group I in the noise analysis (Volume 4 –Chapter 16, page 8,

16.3.11) do not currently frequent the airport. In Group 2, the 2005 data show that one of these aircraft types visits broadly every 3 weeks, with the balance concentrated heavily in Group 4 as Group 3 erroneously includes some types that should be in Group 4.

1.2: Flight Paths

4.7: In practice, the statement “flight paths do not change significantly from current flight paths” is incorrect. Large aircraft are not currently flying from the airport which means the flight paths experienced by local people are those used by light aircraft (< 5.7 tonnes) which have a great deal more flexibility with regard to flight paths than larger aircraft (>5.7tonnes) which must fly clearly prescribed routes. For example, a Boeing 737 must turn right on departure from runway 21 while a small Cessna can turn left or right. This has major implications for the town of Lydd which will experience a great deal more noise than it has in the past should the airport’s plans come to fruition. Similarly, a small Cessna does not need to use the Instrument Landing System (ILS) when landing on runway 21, but a Boeing 737 does, which has implications for residents along the ILS flight path, and particularly for those in the coastal towns - Hythe, Dymchurch, Littlestone and Greatstone. The airport is attempting to give the impression that the issue is one of degree. This is not the case – in practice the airport’s expansion, if realised, will lead to a step jump in the pattern of flying in the area and the type of aircraft experienced.

1.3:

4.12: This paragraph is both misleading and incorrect for the following reasons.

(a) The purpose of the runway is to attract new aircraft types which currently can't use the runway commercially, for example, a Boeing 737 which would use the starter runway. These aircraft types are NOT using the airport currently so it is misleading to say “than at present”.

(b) LAA itself claims that it cannot fly to a sufficient range of destinations with B737s and A319s (mythical as they are not present) because they are weight-restricted on the current length of runway. LAA's own case is that these mythical current B737 operators will use the new runway length not to get airborne earlier, but to increase the aircraft weight - thus taking longer to get airborne. So they will actually be getting airborne at much the same point, but doing so at higher weights.

(c) Since these aircraft will, by LAA's own account, be operating at higher weights, they will have a lower rate of climb, a lower rate of acceleration and a higher required speed for the climb, so they may well (a) take longer to get to 500ft to start the turn and (b) take longer to get to the minimum speed required to perform the turn. All of those factors will take them closer to R063 (if turning left) and D044 (if turning right).

2.0: Some Key Material Considerations in Determining Applications Y06/1647/SH and Y06/1648/SH - Volume 1 of 5, 5.

2.1: Aviation White Paper

5.3 & 5.4: The planning application does not comply with the Aviation White Paper (*The Future of Air Transport, December 2003/ Progress report 2006*) as implementation would mean failure to make best use of existing runways in Kent and

the effective promotion of a new regional airport in Kent over the existing better equipped Manston Airport (Kent International Airport).

In the preparation of the Aviation White Paper the government examined the capacity of established airports including the smaller airports (See Page 109 of the *Second Edition February 2003: The Future Development of Air Transport in the United Kingdom: South East – A National Consultation*). This analysis shows the airports potential passenger capacity in 2030, assuming that maximum use is made of existing runways in the major South East Airports and that no new runway capacity is provided in the region. Lydd Airport's potential was estimated to be 125,000ppa in 2030 from its existing runway – an estimate which takes into account local constraints as well as runway capacity.

Lydd Airport today is operating at 1.3% (1673 passengers in 2008) of its 125,000ppa potential in 2030. Lydd Airport itself claims its current terminal has a capacity of 300,000ppa, which indicates its existing runway has at least this capacity, then at current levels of operation the airport is operating at less than 1% of current runway capacity. Lydd Airport is therefore failing to make best use of its existing runway before embarking on expansion.

Manston Airport by contrast to Lydd was forecast in the documentation supporting the White Paper to have a capacity of 3mppa - later raised to 4-6mppa - by 2030 based on its existing runway. It too is operating at less than 1% of its capacity, illustrating in combination with Lydd Airport that Kent has significant excess runway capacity and that this should be fully utilised before more capacity is created in the area (a).

The table below shows just how much excess capacity there is in Kent. Both Lydd and Manston are operating at a fraction of their potential capacities **based on their existing runways**. Even based on the more conservative White Paper potential capacity of Lydd in 2030 of 125,000ppa, Lydd Airport has never operated at more than 4% of its total capacity. Similarly capacity utilisation at Manston has not exceeded 4%. Using Lydd Airport's Upper Baseline figure of 300,000ppa as the airport's existing capacity - then capacity utilisation at the airport has been 1% for the 16 of the last 17 years, and the one exception was a rate of 2% in 1992.

Table 1: Passengers Numbers & Capacity Utilisation 1992-2008 - Existing Runways*

| Year | Lydd Airport | | | Manston Airport | |
|------|-------------------|---|---|-------------------|--|
| | No. of Passengers | Passengers as % of “White Paper” Potential Capacity, 125,000ppa | Passengers as % of Upper Baseline Capacity 300,000ppa | No. of Passengers | Passengers as % of White Paper Potential Capacity 6million** |
| 1992 | 5,000 | 4% | 2% | | |
| 1993 | 1,000 | 1% | <1% | | |
| 1994 | - | | | | |
| 1995 | - | | | | |
| 1996 | - | | | | |
| 1997 | 2,000 | 2% | 1% | | |
| 1998 | 2,000 | 2% | 1% | | |
| 1999 | 3,000 | 2% | 1% | | |
| 2000 | 1,000 | 1% | <1% | 6,000 | <<1% |
| 2001 | - | | | 6,000 | <<1% |
| 2002 | 3,000 | 2% | 1% | - | |
| 2003 | 4,000 | 3% | 1% | 3,000 | <<1% |
| 2004 | 4,000 | 3% | 1% | 101,000 | 2 |
| 2005 | 3,000 | 2% | 1% | 207,000 | 4 |
| 2006 | 3,000 | 2% | 1% | 10,000 | <<1% |
| 2007 | 3000 | 2% | 1% | 16,000 | <<1% |
| 2008 | 2000 | 2% | 1% | 12,000 | <<1% |
| | | | | | |

Source: CAA * (figures are rounded to the nearest thousand)

Note: Manston Airport (Kent International Airport) was granted a full Civil Aviation Authority Licence on August 31st 1999 - in addition to a freight licence

** Manston was considered to have the potential to contribute 3million passengers per annum and later this was raised to 4-6mppa as a result of an independent study by A.D. Little. The original research for Manston was undertaken in 1999 when the airport was still a military airport. The new owners challenged the figure and produced a report that was accepted by the government.

(a) *The Future of Air Transport, December 2003,*

In relation to the South East, the paper’s executive summary clearly sets out (Page 13 & 14) that:

“The first priority is to make best use of existing runways, including the remaining capacity of Stansted and Luton”

“There is scope for other existing South East airports, including London City, Norwich, Southampton and some smaller airports, to meet local demand, and their future development is supported in principle, subject to relevant environmental considerations.”

Note the emphasis is on:

(1) existing runways.

(2) local demand and the fact that the development is subject to relevant environmental considerations, a factor that is highly relevant to Lydd Airport.

2.2: South East Plan

5.8 -5.10: The South East Plan has yet to be adopted and the sequence of events in the consultation process is as follows. Reference to Lydd Airport was taken out of the draft South East Plan as the airport was regarded as having local, as opposed to regional significance. Although it was not recommended by the Inspector, the Secretary of State chose to follow the approach taken in the Aviation White Paper and give “in principle” support to the expansion of regional airports. LAAG in its response to the “changes” consultation pointed out that this approach was illogical.

The sentence in the revised section of the South East Plan: In addition to the potential previously identified for Southampton, smaller regional airports, such as Kent International Airport, could play a valuable role in meeting local demand and contributing to regional economic development - implies that there are other airports of similar size to Kent International Airport (Manston) in the South East which could assume similar regional status i.e. become of regional significance. This is not the case. Studies supporting the Aviation White Paper clearly show that, of the smaller commercial airports falling into the catchment area of the South East Plan, only Southampton and Kent International (Manston) Airports have the inherent capacities of regional airports. Shoreham and Lydd Airports are the only remaining commercial airports and their inherent constraints indicate they are only of local significance. For detail see: *Appendix 1, LAAG’s comments to changes to the draft South East Plan*

2.3: Kent and Medway Structure Plan

5.11-5.13: TP 25 states that the expansion of Lydd airport will be supported but this can only take place if certain stringent conditions are satisfied including demonstrating that development will not adversely affect designated sites and reduce the amenity of local communities. LAAG along with other environmental groups and statutory consultees, such as Natural England and Kent County Council, have shown that Lydd Airport has not been able to demonstrate that their expansion plans will not have an adverse impact on the important European habitats that surround the airport/runway – as required by the Habitats Regulations This alone is grounds for objecting to the airport’s expansion plans.

2.4: Shepway Local Plan

5.14-5.15: The reference to “ *it could support increased aviation activity on a scale of 1 to 2 million passengers per year*” is clearly incorrect as it refers to the old Kent and Medway Structure Plan. The current plan policy (TP25) makes no reference to passenger numbers.

Policy TR14 of the Local Plan clearly states that expansion will be allowed *provided there would be no significant impact upon the internationally important wildlife communities in the Lydd/Dungeness Area. Regard will also be given to the likely effect of proposals on other special features in the area, particularly the power station.* As mentioned earlier, Lydd Airport has not been able to demonstrate that the current expansion programme will not have an adverse impact on the nature conservation areas surrounding the airport/runway. Further, British Energy objected to the planning application on both safety grounds and concerns that the Airport’s development could jeopardise the planning application for Dungeness C.

2.5: Key Planning History

5.18-5.21: Previous planning decisions cannot be used as a precedent as there have been considerable changes to the local environment since the last planning application

lapsed - “consistent support” cannot be guaranteed due to the scale of these changes. These changes are grouped under the following headings – operational, environmental and economic.

Operational

- (1) The upper limits of the Lydd and Hythe Ranges were raised on 14 June 2001, from 3200 to 4000 feet at Lydd and from 2000 to 3200 feet at Hythe. The main impact of these changes is on the viability of an ILS procedure for runway 21.
- (2) Imposition from 5 September 2002 of a statutory requirement to remain at least 1.5nm clear of the Dungeness power station under the terms of Statutory Instrument 2002/2254. This made left turns on departure from runway 21 by larger aircraft impossible.
- (3) Replacement of the ILS (which, in 1988, was located adjacent to Taxiway A at the north end of the airfield) with a 5° offset ILS located south of the runway. The glideslope angle is unchanged since 1988 at 3.5° but the 1988 installation is understood not to have been offset from the runway centreline. Lydd Airport is the only civil airport in the UK to have an ILS with a 5 degree offset. This means pilots must make a manual adjustment to bring the aircraft on to the centre line of the runway, thus increasing the risk of pilot error.
- (4) Addition of an NDB instrument approach procedure to the airfield from the north, which does not meet ICAO criteria since it does not intercept the runway centreline, and which is offset by 21° from the runway orientation. The manoeuvre to land on runway 21 from this approach requires aircraft to point towards the power station.
- (5) Removal of the air traffic control radar. This had an important role in assisting pilots to remain clear of restricted airspace as well as performing its principal role of ensuring separation between aircraft. There is no reference in the current plans for the airport to install a radar system.

All of those changes either increase the constraints on Lydd Airport operations and/or reduce the margins of safety in respect of the risk of an aircraft crashing.

Environmental

- (1) The conservation credentials of the Dungeness Peninsular have been reinforced by the designation of important habitats under European laws since the last application – the Dungeness to Pett Level Special Protection Area (SPA) and the Dungeness Special Area of Conservation (SAC). In addition a RAMSAR site is currently being designated. Further, Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) surrounding the airport/runway, (national designations) have been recently amalgamated and expanded to create the Dungeness, Romney Marsh and Rye Bay SSSI.

Economic

- (1) The planning application for Dungeness C could be jeopardised by the creation of a regional passenger airport less than 3 miles away from the nuclear complex.
- (2) Low cost airlines have emerged and these operators employ a fraction of the staff employed by full service airlines and this is reflected in the low staffing levels of the airports that service them. An indication of the scale of the change is provided by the relevant employment levels of the airlines

- themselves - Ryanair employs 85 people per million passengers carried, compared to 1400 staff per million passengers at British Airways.
- (3) Manston was still a military airfield and not designated as a regional commercial passenger airport.

3.0: Volume 3 of 5, Appendix 1 - Socio-Economic Update (Runway Extension and Terminal Building)

3.1: Changes in the socio-economic conditions

2.1-2.30: The analysis is flawed. As the document states the most severe deprivation in Shepway is concentrated in Folkestone – not Romney Marsh. The area around Lydd has one of the largest, if not the largest employer, in Kent – the Dungeness nuclear power complex. There are understandably fewer large employers in the surrounding area outside the Dungeness nuclear complex as the area surrounding Lydd is a rural area, with a large proportion of the land protected from development by law. It is an area renowned and protected for its natural qualities not as a source of employment land. The issue locally is one of education to give the children the mobility to seek jobs outside the area.

Unemployment is increasing across the UK. The figures shown in the table in 2.26 are meaningless unless they are compared with baseline figures for other areas. Baseline figures for Great Britain, South East England and Kent are conveniently not shown, as one suspects the increase in unemployment in Shepway, Lydd and Romney Marsh is lower than in some or all of these areas.

3.2: Benefits of LAA Expansion

3.2.1: Employment

4.3-4.6: LAAG has refuted the employment claims made by Lydd Airport in previous submissions and we refer you to our original submission dated April 26th 2007.

LAAG can demonstrate that a more realistic rule of thumb for direct employment at Lydd Airport is 300 jobs per million passenger throughput, compared to the 600 jobs per million estimate used by the airport. Allowing for the diseconomies of scale due to throughput being below one million passengers per annum, then the number is expected to be in the region of 175 people per 500,000ppa.

These are gross figures - the airport fails to take into account the impact its expansion will have on the local tourist industry and the nuclear power industry. A full analysis is provided in LAAG's original submission.

3.2.2: Tourism

4.10-4.24: As section 8.0 of LAAG's response to Lydd Airport's first set of Supplementary Environmental Information (SEI 1) dated November 15th, 2007 demonstrates, the claims made by Lydd Airport over the tourists generated by Lydd Airport, the job created by these tourists, and the economic stimulus they provide – are incorrect.

3.3: No Case for Two Regional Airports in Kent

There is no case for a second regional airport in Kent. Lydd and Manston Airports are operating at a fraction of their rated capacity and both are heavily loss making - indicating that there is not sufficient demand for one regional airport in Kent, let alone two.

| Table 2: Turnover and Losses Made by Lydd and Manston Airports* | | |
|--|-----------------------|------------------------|
| | Lydd Airport | Manston Airport |
| Year | Year to December 2007 | Year to March 2008 |
| Turnover | £684,000 | £6,863,000 |
| Loss Before Tax | £1,920,000 | £4,040,000 |
| * Source: Latest Report and Accounts | | |

Manston Airport is losing £4m per year and Lydd Airport £2m, giving a combined loss of £6m. Both airports are currently operating at less than 1% of their capacity (see Table 1 and 3 below) indicating there is not high demand for their services.

There is little competition between the two airports today as Lydd's existing runway cannot commercially handle B737 and A319s. Lydd Airport can operate limited short haul routes with smaller aircraft, but outside its small Trislander service to Le Touquet, it has failed to do so. (In theory Lydd Airport could accommodate the same aircraft configuration at City Airport in London)

The poor financial results cannot be attributed to the current economic environment as the results are for periods before the full impact of the current downturn. Manston Airport has a history of failure since it became a commercial entity. Planestation, the airport's previous owner went into receivership in a bull (i.e. very buoyant) market.

Manston's losses were also made before competition from an expanded Lydd Airport. If Lydd Airport is allowed to lengthen its runway, capacity will be increased and these two airports will more directly compete in the short haul market as Lydd will then be able to commercially support - the Boeing 737 and Airbus 319 aircraft types - the work horses of the low cost operators.

Claims by Lydd Airport that the two airports will be complementary are fatuous. As the Manston master plan and Lydd Airport's marketing documents show, their passenger catchment areas overlap. As far as routes are concerned these will be dictated by the airline operators and the indicative routes given by both airports for short haul travel show common routes. To the extent that Lydd Airport will be **unable** to operate in the long haul space - even after the runway extension - the airports will be complementary. The inability to cater for long haul operators will also rule Lydd out of the wider freight market. However, in the short haul market the two airports will be directly competitive after the runway extension.

Table 3: Passenger Numbers & Capacity Utilisation, 2008*

| Year | Lydd Airport | | | Manston Airport | |
|------|-------------------|---|---|-------------------|--|
| | No. of Passengers | Passengers as % of “White Paper” Potential Capacity, 125,000ppa | Passengers as % of Upper Baseline Capacity 300,000ppa | No. of Passengers | Passengers as % of White Paper Potential Capacity 6million** |
| 2008 | 2000 | 2% | 1% | 12,000 | <<1% |

Source: CAA * (figures are rounded to the nearest thousand)

** Manston was considered to have the potential to contribute 3million passengers per annum and later this was raised to 4-6mppa as a result of an independent study by A.D. Little. The original research for Manston was undertaken in 1999 when the airport was still a military airport. The new owners challenged the figure and produced a report that was accepted by the government.

Manston is the superior airport as the table below shows (extracted from a report by Spaven Consulting - *Appendix 2- Summary Comparison of Operational Facilities and Infrastructure for Commercial Airline Traffic At Lydd And Manston Airports, Spaven Consulting, March, 2009.*) The table compares Lydd and Manston airports from the prospective of an airline looking to make a choice between the two. The table looks at the operational issues and compares Manston Airport, with Lydd Airport today (without the runway extension) and Lydd assuming it is granted planning permission for the runway extension and new terminal.

The table clearly shows that even allowing for Lydd’s proposed runway extension, Manston is operationally superior. Manston has a longer runway which means it can support long haul as well as short haul operators, has instrument approaches to both runways whereas Lydd Airport has an ILS only on one runway, has a standard glide path and ILS, whereas Lydd Airport has non standard procedures – indeed Lydd is the only civil airport with a 5 degree offset ILS. Other features giving Manston a competitive advantage include Radar - Lydd has no radar and no plans for radar despite having significant airspace restrictions in its vicinity due to the proximity of military ranges and nuclear power stations. The proximity of these features raises safety issues and uncertainty for a potential customer as there is no guarantee that height restrictions above these features will not rise.

Table 4: Lydd versus Manston - Operational Features

| <i>Feature</i> | <i>Manston</i> | <i>Lydd (current)</i> | <i>Lydd (with runway extension and new terminal)</i> |
|---|--|---|---|
| Runway length – length of runway strip | 2752 metres | 1505 metres | 1799 metres (plus 150 metre starter extension) |
| Runway length – maximum take-off distance available | 3169 metres | 1979 metres | 1979 metres |
| Runway length – maximum landing distance available for aircraft using ILS | 2752 metres | 1470 metres | Theoretically 1799 metres but may be limited to 1470 metres |
| Runway sufficient for B747 commercial operations | Yes | No | No |
| Runway length sufficient for B737/A320 commercial operations | Yes | No | Yes, with restrictions |
| Runway/taxiway width and runway/taxiway/apron strength | Adequate for most operations up to B747 size | Adequate for most operations up to B737/A320 size | Adequate for most operations up to B737/A320 size |
| Uncongested runways | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Unrestricted taxiways for commercial aircraft | Some restrictions | Major restrictions | Some restrictions |
| Instrument approaches to both runways | Yes | No | No |
| Approaches possible down to Category 1 minimum of 200 feet above runway | Yes (runway 28 only) | No | No |
| Instrument Landing System glideslope angle | 3° (=standard) | 3.5° (=maximum) | 3.5° (=maximum) |
| ILS angle of offset from runway centreline | Nil | 5° (=maximum) | 5° (=maximum) |
| Alternative instrument procedures available to commercial airliners if ILS out of service | Two | None practicable | None practicable |
| Runway lighting category | Full | Intermediate | Not known |
| Wind limits on availability of airport to B737/A320 | No | Yes | Yes |

| | | | |
|---|----------|--|--------------------|
| Air traffic control radar | Yes | No | No published plans |
| Airspace efficiency (direct routings, no holding) | Moderate | Moderate to poor | Moderate to poor |
| Airspace restrictions | None | Significant | Significant |
| Good aircraft stand availability | Yes | Yes (but not connected with terminal facilities) | Yes |
| Terminal capable of handling one low cost operator | Yes | No | Yes |
| Owned by a company with experience with low cost operations | Yes | No | No |
| Experience of low cost operations at this airport | Yes | No | No |
| Number of passengers in 2008 | 11,657 | 1,673 | n/a |
| Tonnes of freight in 2008 | 25,673 | 0 | n/a |

Source: Spaven Consulting

Despite its shortcomings, Lydd Airport with its extended runway would provide additional competition for Manston in the short haul market as the runway extension would allow the airport to commercially operate B737 and A319s for the first time – the competition would be particularly aggressive, were Lydd to adopt aggressive route development incentives.

What are the Implications of an expanded Lydd Airport

It will be impossible for two regional airports less than 50 miles by road from each other to survive commercially, particularly given their coastal locations (catchment area is only half that of an inland airport). Manston Airport has struggled as a going concern as an independent commercial airport, despite its attributes. Lydd Airport has also failed to utilise excess capacity on its existing smaller 1505m runway which allows limited short haul services. Increasing capacity at Lydd will not increase demand for short haul services in Kent.

Not only would Lydd Airport's expansion plans erode Manston Airport's short haul passenger base but it would also affect Infratil's – the airport's current owners - ability to raise external funds for expansion. Planestation, the previous owner of Manston, raised over £50m in shares and loan stock from the City about 18 months before they went into liquidation and were taken over by Infratil in August 2005. Had the institutions who participated in this fund raising been aware of Lydd Airport's ambitious expansion plans which would have adversely affected the outlook for Manston - one of Planestation's principal assets - Planestation would have struggled to raise this sum. Lydd Airport's expansion plans are now widely known, and if they are realised, Infratil's ability to raise external funds for future expansion will be more difficult.

The net result will be two adjacent unprofitable airports with limited employment opportunities. Given that Manston is an established airport with superior operational resources, and better transport connections, it appears only logical that this airport should be allowed to grow and become profitable. It is illogical to allow the creation of another regional airport in Kent when the better equipped airport Manston is operating at a fraction of its total capacity and is financially struggling.

Summary:

- **Lydd and Manston airports are currently operating at 1% capacity**
- **Lydd and Manston airports are heavily loss making**
- **Adding capacity at Lydd Airport by increasing the runway length will put further pressure on the viability of these two airports.**
- **Increasing the runway length at Lydd airport will allow this airport to commercially operate Boeing 737s and Airbus 319s - the work horses of the low cost industry - and make Lydd more competitive with Manston in the short haul market.**
- **The additional capacity will not lead to additional demand – Manston will face extra competition from Lydd Airport and the latter will be unable to recover its investment. The airports will remain loss making and have limited scope for increasing employment.**
- **Manston’s historic ability to raise money from the financial markets via its parent company will be undermined by the presence of another regional airport in Kent.**
- **Manston is a superior airport to Lydd even after Lydd Airport’s proposed runway extension.**
- **Regional profit and employment maximisation will occur if Manston, Kent’s established regional airport, is allowed to develop free of competition from Lydd.**
- **There is no case for two regional airports in Kent - Lydd Airport should remain a local airport.**

4.0: Volume 3 of 5 - Appendix 2- Aircraft Crash Risks to Dungeness Nuclear Power Stations

LAAG notes Areva Risk Management Consulting’s (Areva’s) acknowledgement that the risk of crash damage increases as a result of Lydd Airport’s expansion and that the crash damage frequency is above the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate’s (NII’s) screening criteria of 1 in 10 million per year. LAAG also welcomes Areva’s input into the debate on the risks of locating a regional airport adjacent to a nuclear power complex.

At this stage in the planning process, LAAG takes the view that Shepway District Council (SDC) will be relying on the existing opinion of the NII for direction over whether or not safety is a material issue in this planning application. LAAG is currently challenging the NII over its decision **not** to oppose the planning application on crash damage safety grounds and is seeking ministerial support for an independent review of the NII's position. Our discourse is directed to the NII and to government ministers.

As for the divided opinion of experts, John Large welcomes the opportunity to debate the nuances of opinion with regard to materiality with Areva before an inspector in a public inquiry. In the meantime we make the following points.

- (1) John Large is one of a number of independent experts who believe the NII should be opposing the planning application on crash damage safety grounds.
- (2) All commentators in this debate - British Energy/EDF, NII, John Large and Areva agree that there will be an increase in risk - the issue is one of opinion over what is acceptable.
- (3) Common sense would suggest that nuclear power stations and regional airports are incompatible.
- (4) SDC cannot assume that the NII's stance on Dungeness B - ie its belief that crash damage risk is not material - will hold for a proposed new nuclear power station. It is the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), not the NII, which makes the strategic siting assessment for the new proposed nuclear power stations. At the strategic level this body has acknowledged that it will consider proximity to civil aircraft movements. It will take advice from specialists including regulators, such as the NII, and others...in other words it is not solely down to the views of the NII, and it is not their decision. If other organisations or individuals convince DECC that having a regional airport adjacent to a nuclear power station is not acceptable, or there is open public controversy over this issue, and SDC supports the planning application for Lydd Airport's development, it could jeopardise the planning application for Dungeness C – a far superior local employer.
- (5) The NII and British Energy have clearly stated that the safety case was based upon 2mppa not 500,000 ppa. This was confirmed in letters sent by NII to various objectors in October 2008.
- (6) One of the contentions made to the NII by LAAG is that the approach to crash frequency and consequence analysis is too generalised and this is confirmed by the Areva report.

Areva's application of the Byrne's methodology means that the probability calculations are based upon a standard airport and derived using UK average crash rate statistics. Lydd Airport is **not** a standard airport. The airport faces restricted airspace over the Lydd and Hythe military ranges as well as the nuclear power complex and as a result only has an Instrument Landing System on one runway - runway 21. Lydd Airport is the only civil airport in the UK to have a 5 degree offset ILS (the maximum possible) which means pilots must make a manual adjustment to reach the runway centre line, raising the risk of pilot error. The airport also has a 3.5 degree glide path as opposed to the standard of 3 degrees. These factors in combination mean complex flight

procedures are required, particularly by large aircraft (B737) departing and landing from the airport. The airport is also located under the main migratory bird route in the south of England which means the risk of bird strike is high. All these factors will increase the probability of crash damage at Dungeness relative to the standard used in Areva's comparison. It appears that none of these risks which are specific to Lydd airport have been addressed in the Areva report.

Further, the Areva report does not consider aborted flights either in terms of frequency or added risk. The wind direction problems will mean that there will be a higher than average rate of aborted landings. This not only increases the Lydd flight frequency from the figures given in the Areva report but it is also the case that such flights will carry with them a higher level of risk as they are in a less controlled situation.

An extract from a report by Spaven Consulting (*London Ashford Airport (Lydd): Review of aviation operational issues relating to dungeness power station, Spaven Consulting, November 2008*) included as part of LAAG's submission to the NII summarises the particular circumstances.

The circumstances in which the second scenario might occur have changed since 1988. Go-arounds from the ILS approach are now more likely because it is offset from the runway centreline by the maximum allowed 5°, as well as having the steepest allowable glidepath. In addition to that, Lydd Airport has based its operational case on airliners using runway 21 for landing in tailwinds of up to 10 knots – a much larger tailwind component than is accepted at other UK airports with preferential runway schemes.¹ Putting those factors together – high ground speed due to a tailwind, a steeper than normal approach and the requirement for a turn to align with the runway at a late stage in the approach – makes it much more likely that the aircraft is not stabilised on the approach in time to make a safe landing, and the crew opt to go-around.

At Heathrow, Birmingham and East Midlands, the preferred runway is only used when the tailwind is 5 knots or less.

- (7) In 2008 the NII states that "the risk of impact on the nuclear site primarily comes from random failures of aircraft, unconnected with take off and landing activities at Lydd Airport" (response to LAAG members from the NII, October 2008 and reiterated by Areva). By contrast the 1988 crash damage report was based solely on the risk posed by operations at Lydd Airport, with no mention of any other aviation activity. The contradiction remains unexplained.
 - (8) In 1988 the planning condition set by Shepway District Council after discussion with the NII, restricted the number of movements made by aircraft over 5.7tonnes to no more than 6000 per annum. Lydd Airport's 1988 planning application was for passenger numbers up to 2million passengers per annum. The current planning application which is only for passenger numbers up to 500,000ppa is predicted (by Lydd Airport) to produce around 16,000 movements per annum by aircraft over 5.7tonnes – over 2.5X the limit agreed by the NII in 1988, yet the NII appears to find this acceptable from a safety perspective. This is a major relaxation of a previous restriction which was
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deemed necessary to maintain the safety case and Shepway District Council has a duty to ensure that it fully understands why the NII has deemed this relaxation acceptable particularly as this factor will form part of the ongoing debate over the suitability of Dungeness for a new nuclear power station.

Summary

- **LAAG is challenging the NII over its decision NOT to oppose the planning application for Lydd Airport's expansion on crash damage safety grounds, and is seeking ministerial support for an independent assessment of the NII's position.**
- **One of LAAG's contentions, which form part of its challenge to the NII, is that the assessment methodology is too generalised and fails to take into account the riskier operational background at Lydd. The Areva report confirms this over generalised approach and the failure to address the specific hazards associated with Lydd Airport.**
- **Shepway District Council cannot assume that the NII's stance on Dungeness B - ie its belief that crash damage risk is not material - will hold for a proposed new nuclear power station. The siting decision rests with the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), not the NII. Proximity to civil aircraft movements will be considered in the siting process which means an on going public debate about the safety risks associated with having a regional airport at Lydd could jeopardise the planning application for Dungeness C.**
- **There has been a major relaxation of a previous planning restriction agreed with the NII which was deemed necessary to maintain the safety case in 1988. Shepway District Council has a duty to ensure that it fully understands why the NII has deemed this relaxation to be acceptable particularly as this factor will form part of the ongoing debate over the suitability of Dungeness for a new nuclear power station.**

5.0: Volume 4 of 5: Noise and Vibration Relating to Planning Application Y06/1647/SH and Y06/1648/SH

While there have been some significant corrections to flight information there remain sufficient errors to render the associated noise analysis invalid. The detail is outlined in the Appendix 3 analysis by Spaven Consulting (*Review of Submitted Information on Aviation Operational Aspects, Spaven Consulting, April 2009*) and the summary of his report is set out below. In addition we would like to add the following comments.

As a future mitigation strategy (Future Mitigation Scenario – 16.9.2 -16.9.10) Lydd Airport examines the credibility of operating flights through the Lydd military range (D044). It points out that the range is not active for 37% of the time between 8.30 and 23.00 and suggests that even allowing for its proposed hours of operation (no flights between 23:00 hours and 7.00 hours) flight paths through the Lydd military range using “down time” during active days as well as “days off” could be regarded as a mitigation strategy. This is not the case for the following reasons.

- (1) The Lydd Military Range is used for at least 300 days of the year. Firing takes place between 8.30am and 11pm at night and since the airport is not proposing to fly at night then 300 days represents 82% of the year, ie it is not operating for 65 days - 18% of the days. The MOD has confirmed this figure. Lydd Airport has taken the downtime during “active” days to get to the 37% “available” time - for example lunch breaks and “change overs”. In the notices posted locally to inform the ranges firing programme it states in the small print that firing times within a day cannot be accurately programmed which makes the use of down time impractical.
- (2) The MOD has confirmed that it would not allow flying during downtime on active days and commercial airlines would not countenance such a risky policy.
- (3) The remaining 65 days when the range is not open are accounted for by a two week period over Christmas and a one week period over the summer for general maintenance - 21 days in total - with the remainder of the days occurring intermittently, making planning difficult. This means in practice only 21 consistent days are available (6% of the days) to the airport, and this time is not guaranteed as the MOD might be reluctant to allow over-flying during these periods to retain optimum flexibility.

There is another factor that Shepway District Council (SDC) ought to take into account when considering flight paths and community nuisance. Low cost operators are the most likely operators to patronise Lydd Airport and their model depends on 24 operations to maximise aircraft load factors. It is possible that Lydd Airport will be approached by an airline wishing to operate on a 24 hour basis as its licence allows. We have already indicated the fragility of the Lydd Airport’s business model both before and after the runway extension and the strong possibility of continued losses. Against this background there will be pressure put on Shepway District Council by the airport to change the Section 106 agreement to allow night flying, leading to ongoing trouble and expense for the Council as a result of community opposition.

Summary Spaven Consulting Report

- **The baseline aircraft movements’ data used for construction of the noise model show anomalies in the counting of several types of aircraft.**
- **The grouping of aircraft types into four size-related categories for the purposes of flight paths and noise impact contains significant errors.**
- **The number of movements by Group 2 jet types used for the baseline is overstated approximately four-fold.**
- **There are significant mismatches between the stated flight paths used by the different Groups of aircraft in Appendix 16.4A, and those depicted on the flight path maps at Figures 16.1 and 16.2.**
- **There remain serious questions over the feasibility of commercial passenger transport aircraft performing the manoeuvres necessary to land on runway 03 while danger area D044 is active.**

- **No assessment has been made of the frequency with which Group 1 aircraft would have to divert or have their flight cancelled due to a northerly/easterly wind preventing landing at Lydd. Without such an assessment the assumed 70/30 modal split for future operations is invalid.**
- **Trislander operations have been omitted from the future noise assessment and have not been replaced by an appropriate equivalent type.**
- **Figures are quoted for the expected proportion of time when flights may operate through the Lydd Range airspace. However access other than before or after the operational day at the range is understood not to be possible.**
- **The proposed mitigation of flying through the range airspace when it is not active takes no account of the non-availability of instrument approaches to runway 03.**
- **Depicted flight paths for aircraft approaching runway 03 when the range is not active would only be usable for visual approaches.**
- **There are numerous errors and inaccuracies in the depiction of flight paths in Figures 16.1 and 16.2.**
- **Overall, the inaccuracies and incorrect assumptions with regard to flight paths render any noise assessment invalid.**

6.0: Volume 5 of 5 - Appendix 6 - Surface Water Drainage Strategy

There ecological impact of the surface water drainage strategy is covered by Swift Ecology in *Appendix 4*. There remains confusion over the size of the runway strip and therefore the status of “Pond A” located beside the runway. As pointed out in previous submissions the biodiversity action plan should be clearly set out and assessed before the planning application is determined.

The conclusions and recommendations from Swift Ecology’s report are shown below.

Recommendations

- **You should continue to seek clarification on the requirement for a 150 m wide graded safety strip along the edge of the runway, because of the implications of this on vegetated shingle and great crested newt, both SSSI and SAC features.**
- **There should be a S.106 agreement requiring that de-icing of the runway is undertaken using mechanical methods rather than by application of chemical de-icers, so that water quality in the surrounding ditches is maintained as high as possible**
- **The newly created drains should not be connected to any land-drains to minimise agricultural fertiliser input to them, and optimise conditions for ditch plants and animals.**
- **Proposals for management of the habitats, and biodiversity targets should be clarified and presented in the Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP)**

before the planning application is considered, so that it is clear what advantages will be gained from this document, and to test that the targets are achievable.

- **The developers should be asked to reconcile how they can promote conservation of the medicinal leech, as stated in their BAP, when their bird scaring requirements around the airport are likely to remove the most significant warm-blooded prey species from the site, i.e. nesting waterfowl.**
- **If a new ditch is to be extended into the SSSI it should not pass close enough to risk flooding and joining up to existing newt ponds during periods of wet weather (minimum separation distance of 20 m recommended), because of the risk of introducing predatory fish from the main ditch network into the newt ponds.**

7.0: Volume 5 of 5: Appendix 6 - Proposed Foul Water Sewage Solutions

Shepway District Council should note that the preferred option of Lydd Airport outlined in the previous set of Supplementary Environmental Information (SEI 2) – Volume 6 of 8, Appendix 7 – was for the construction of an on-site sewerage treatment plant or pumping station and one suspects this is still the main objective but this has been replaced in the short term with an option that can be expedited without recourse to an Appropriate Assessment under the Habitat Regulations. Shepway District Council must determine: (a) whether the proposed current solution is viable over the longer term and (b) the environmental implications of whatever solution is adopted.

Lydd Airport must outline the preferred solution, or the options proposed, in detail, so that it is possible to determine whether an Appropriate Assessment under the Habitats Regulations is required should any plans for foul water sewage impinge on the Natura 2000 sites (i.e. the surrounding SAC and SPA), or indeed on the SSSI.

The current solution for the main buildings is to use the current septic capacity to cater for 300,000ppa for which the airport has a discharge consent licence from the Environment Agency. The discharge from the septic tank runs via a soakaway distribution pipe work into the Denge Marsh sewer, an open surface dyke containing free flowing surface water via a reed bed.

The incremental 200,000ppa will be catered for by (1) connection to the Southern Water Sewer or (2) installation of dedicated cesspools. No detail has been given for these two options.

Lydd Airport's consultant has only confirmed with Southern Water that a connection to the sewer in Lydd is possible for this capacity. It has not outlined the consequences in terms of the pipes needed, their depth, width and the distance covered or the nature or location of the pumping station. Similarly, how big will the cesspools be that are required for the incremental sewage, and where will they be located. These plans are likely to be material and need to be outlined in detail, and consulted upon, before the planning application is determined. Cesspools and Tankering does not seem a viable alternative given the extra road traffic created and the environmental damage from possible cesspool leakage.

- **The proposals are unlikely to represent a long term solution**
- **A detailed account of the two options for the incremental sewage must be given to ensure the environmental implications are fully understood.**

Yours Sincerely

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APPENDICES: 1-4

Appendix 1: *LAAG's Submission to the South East Plan*

Appendix 2: *Summary Comparison of Operational Facilities and Infrastructure for Commercial Airline Traffic At Lydd And Manston Airports, Spaven Consulting, March, 2009*

Appendix 3: *Review of Submitted Information on Aviation Operational Aspects: Spaven Consulting, April 2009*

Appendix 4: *Review of the London Ashford Airport Surface Water Drainage Strategy for the Proposed Runway Extension, Swift Ecology, March 2009.*